Abstract-Diversity or redundancy based software fault tolerance encompasses the development of application domain specific variants and error detection mechanisms. In this regard, this paper presents an analytical design strategy to develop the variants for a fault tolerant real-time control system. This work also presents a generalized error detection mechanism based on the stability performance of a designed controller using the Lyapunov Stability Criterion. The diverse redundant fault tolerance is implemented with an aspect oriented compiler to separate and thus reduce this additional complexity. A Mathematical Model of an Inverted Pendulum System has been used as a case study to demonstrate the proposed design framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of redundancy and diversity in order to tolerate hardware, software and environmental faults is not new [1] . The use of redundancy with respect to time, design and data has been proved successful in improving the dependability of computer based systems [2, 3] . Although a number of schemes to improve software dependability are proposed, there is a need to address low level issues like designing variants and generalized error detection mechanism for particular application domains. The coming sections address analytically redundant controllers design strategy in this regard. These redundant controllers are backed with a model based error detection mechanism. The proposed scheme is demonstrated with an inverted pendulum model based case study. In order to reduce the implementation complexity of proposed scheme, an aspect oriented version of such dependable framework is also provided. This framework is ported to Matlab/Simulink using an S-Function Wrapper for the validation of proposed scheme.
II. ANALYTICALLY REDUNDANT CONTROLLERS DESIGN
The development of redundant software components or variants often requires some performance criterion on the Kashif Hameed, Rob Williams and Jim Smith are with University of the West of England, BIT, Frenchay Campus, Coldharbour Lane, Bristol, BS16 1QY, emails: Kashif3.Hameed@uwe.ac.uk, Rob.Williams@uwe.ac.uk, James.Smith@uwe.ac.uk. basis of which they are developed and ranked. A very common example often provided in the academia are the sorting algorithms [1] that are designed and ranked based on their size and execution times. In the domain of real-time control systems, performance and stability measures such as settling time overshoot and rise time may be used to design and rank controller variants. Thus the variants designed and developed based on such analytical measures are said to be analytically redundant. One such definition is provided by Lui [4] for real time controllers. In his definition attributes like reliability, performance and stability have been chosen as analytical measures. According to him a software component C1 is analytical redundant to C2 with respect to Q j , the measure of quality attribute provided:
, Where i R is the minimal requirement of Q j For example, controllers are said analytically redundant with respect to maintaining stability of the physical system in a feasible region bounded by system states and physical constraints if each one of the controllers asymptotically stabilizes the physical system inside the given region.
In order to demonstrate and analyze the design strategy of analytically redundant controllers, an inverted pendulum system model has been chosen.
A. Inverted Pendulum System
The inverted pendulum (IP) system is a very common example used to validate a variety of controller design strategies because of its non-linear dynamics and inherently unstable behavior. A linearized state space model of IP system is derived to with following set of system parameters. [6] to more robust Optimal Control Strategies [7] . In this work we will concentrate on optimal state feedback control using linear quadratic regulator (LQR) [8] .
Parameter
In a LQR design, the feedback gain matrix K for a linear state feedback control law
is found by minimizing a quadratic cost function of the form:
Q and R are weighting parameters that penalize certain states x and control inputs u respectively. By varying the matrix Q and Scalar R, the analytically redundant controller gains are obtained and the resulting control algorithms may asymptotically stabilize the system at the operating condition X=0. The linearized model of IP system as in equation (1) has been used to design and two different analytically redundant controllers by choosing two different R: R = 0.01 and R=0.1 and assigning equal weigh age to penalty on states forming an identity Q matrix. LQR problem has been solved to obtain the following set of analytically redundant feedback gains: It can be seen that controller K1 performs better than K2 although both the controllers asymptotically stabilize the inverted pendulum to the equilibrium position. The next section investigates and compares safety and stability characteristics of analytically redundant controllers and deduces a design principle based on that.
A. Lyapunov Stability based Error Detection
Every dynamical system has constraints due to physical limits, external environment and operating conditions. These absolute behavior constraints also dictate the boundary of a safe operating region. For example the inverted pendulum case study under consideration has constraints on cart displacement, car speed, pendulum angular movement and maximum voltage of the DC motor. These state constraints are represented by a polygon in an n-dimensional space shown in Figure 1 . A trusty inverted pendulum controller must generate a subset of the states within the safety region and also ensure that future trajectories must also lie within these bounds. If so the stability and safety of the system is ensured. This problem has been formalized mathematically using Lyapunov stability criterion [9] . The solution of Lyapunov criterion based problem provides a Lyapunov function V(x) illustrated by an ellipsoid in Figure 1 . The breaching of safety region boundary indicates a faulty system state or controller. This indication is used to signal an exception or switchover a redundant controller for recovery.
Figure 1 Safety Region and State Constraints
The IP controller problem is solved with LMI solver tool CVX [10] to attain the safety regions (Lyapunov Function) for three variants of IP controller. In addition to the two controllers already designed as LQR problem discussed earlier, the third controller is designed such that it has largest safety region (SR). An important task is to formulate the problem before presenting to CVX tool. It is worth noting that V(x) is not unique for a given system and controller combination, it is therefore required to find largest safety region such that state constraints polytope may not be restricted. The maximum volume of ellipsoid defined by the safety region
Problem Formulation
T is equivalent to minimize (log det P) [11] . The final thing is the LMI based formulation of input, output constraints of the system. The complete set of problem is formulated and presented to CVX tool as follows: 
Figure 2 Safety Regions Comparison
In order to propose a design principle for analytically redundant controllers designed above, a performance comparison by the help of a simulation has been done. Finally Table 2 summarizes the comparison of performance and safety measures of the inverted pendulum case study. 
B. State Machine Based Switching Logic
The IP controller may be in one of the three states {experimental, base-line, safety} ranked from high performance to large safety enveloped controllers respectively. Once a controller is marked faulty, it is disabled and we need two boolean state variables base controller ready (bc_ready) and experimental controller ready (ec_ready) to keep track of which controller is available. In order to describe the behavior of the physical system with relation to system safety and recovery from a faulty situation, we define boolean variables safe and to_bc with the following assignments: If physical system is safe, safe=1 else safe=0 If the active controller is safety controller and system is ready for base-line control to_bc=1 else to_bc=0 The state transition of the active controller is determined by boolean variables bc_reay, ec_ready, safe, to_bc. Figure 3 shows the state transition diagram of the active controller when the boolean expressions on the transition arcs evaluated to true. 
III. SEPARATION OF FAULT TOLERANCE CONCERNS
Unfortunately fault tolerant diverse redundant mechanisms do not come for free, bringing additional cost and complexity to the core application as argued by J. Xu [12] . One of solutions to reduce the additional complexity is by separating and modularizing these non-functional concerns from the core functionality. The evolving area of AspectOriented Programming & Design (AOP&D) supports the modularized implementation of crosscutting concerns. We are benefitting from the power of aspect oriented compiler AspectC++ [13] to weave redundancy related concerns in non-fault tolerant experimental IP controller. The variants of IP controller, error detection mechanism and state machine based switching logic are separated in a well modularized aspect.
IV. AOFT CONTROLLER IMPLEMENTATION IN SIMULINK
In order to validate the proposed design strategy, the AOFT IP controller is ported to modeling/simulation environment Matlab/Simulink using C++ S-Function Wrapper [14] . The transformation process involves the mapping of the output file to an S-function C++ Wrapper after the weaver has merged the functional and aspect code. The IP system is also modeled in Simulink. The transformation process is shown in Figure 4 .
Figure 4 AOFT Controller Porting to S-Function

V. FAULT INJECTION BASED CONTROLLER VALIDATION
Fault injection is a deliberate introduction of faults to access the dependability of computer based systems or validate a fault tolerant strategy. One of commonly used technique is software implemented fault injection (SWIFI). In this technique faults are injected at the actual software of a computing system by corrupting code or data [15] . Code Mutation is also a specific form of static fault injection where source code is changed instead of program/systems state. Actually different versions of the same program are created by making small syntactic changes [16] . The effect of actuator faults on an actuator control has been modeled and simulated in a study by Theilliol et al. [17] . They model the faults as additive and multiplicative effects on the output delivered by the controller. Moreover sensor and actuator faults have also been addressed as additive and multiplicative bias at the input and output in separate studies by Kerrigan and Theilliol et al. [18, 19] . The validation of our proposed design strategy is also done by injecting realizable faults. In order to provide better test coverage, faults are injected in the input/output interfaces between controller and rest of environment and also within the controller component. The faults considered are ill designed faulty gains of the controller and wrong polarity emulating a programming fault. The input/output faults are considered additive and multiplicative in nature simulating common sensor and actuator fault models.
Faults are injected in the primary (experimental controller) whereas other variants (base-line and safety controllers) are assumed fault free.
A. Programming & Design Faults in IP Controller
In this case a mutant IP controller having inherent faulty gains or wrong or opposite signs is used.
Case1: Faulty Controller Gains
The mission objective is to move the cart from its initial position to 10 cm the left of the centre (-0.1m) such that the inverted pendulum remains vertically stable. The gains of the primary controller (experimental controller) are tampered to faulty (ill designed) values. Figure 5 that IP system is unsafe and unstable as the system states cross the safety envelope and then boundary constraints as well. Thus the mission objective is not achieved and results in a failure. With AOFT It has been observed that upon detection of bug at 0.26sec (error detection latency), the active controller is switched to the safety control, and remained under safety control until the physical system is ready for the baseline control even the system is safe at 0.37sec. The Lyapunov function based check monitors whether the system is ready for base-line controller. Thus at 0.67sec the system is switched to intermediate performance base line controller and remained in control afterwards. Figure 5 presents the trajectories of the physical system and safety region plot. The trajectory terminates within the safety region thus demonstrates that the system is asymptotically stable and also converges to the commanded values.
Case2: Sign Bugs
In this case a mutant IP controller having wrong or opposite signs is used. Summary: The IP system is unstable and unsafe without AOFT support as shown in Figure 6 . However in the presence of AOFT, the fault is detected by the help of safety check and recovered by switching over to safety and base line controller for safe operation.
Figure 6 Safety Region & Trajectory
B. Input & Output Interface Faults in IP Controller
In this case input/output interface faults are simulated by injecting multiplicative-additive faults (u f =αu+u 0 ), where u represents non-faulty input or output, α is gain degradation factor and u 0 is an additive bias.
Case1: Multiplicative Output Faults
Here we did not consider the additive bias thus u 0 =0 and only α is varied from 10% to 90% of actual output. It is observed that up to 30% gain degradation may results in 43% of steady state error that is undetected and recovery check is not validated with this degraded performance. Next we consider some cases where partial and total failures are avoided by proposed AOFT framework. Partial Failure Avoided (SS Error of 0.1m) In this case output of experimental controller is degraded by a factor of 0.5 started at about 2sec and AOFT is enabled at 5sec. it is observed from Figure 7 that 100% steady state (SS) error is introduced without AOFT. As soon as the AOFT is enabled, it results in system recovery from this erroneous state and improves the performance characteristics in terms of steady state error and avoids a partial failure.
Figure 7 Recovery from Partial Failure
Total Failure Avoided In this case output of experimental controller is degraded by a gain degradation factor of 0.1 started at about 2sec. it is observed that without fault tolerance measures the system is unsafe and unstable. However, the proposed methodology avoided this failure.
Case2: Additive Output Faults
Here we did not consider the multiplicative effect thus α=1. It has been observed that offset (u 0 ) added to the output resulted in steady state error and makes system unstable and unsafe. Again the proposed methodology prevents such failures.
Simulating External Push Pull Force
Next we consider the case where a sinusoidal fault distribution is applied and then remove after some time. It simulates a transient external push pull force applied by a human or some faulty output interface mechanism. The result of this is the oscillation build up that may lead to a failure. The proposed safety check provides a basis to predict such occurrence before the system is not controllable as shown below. The proposed AOFT helps recovering the system from this failure. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The work presented above adds on to the existing knowledge in fault tolerant control systems by proposing a design strategy that dictates how diversity or redundancy based software fault tolerance frameworks may be incorporated in safety or mission critical control components. It is demonstrated that fault tolerance management issues like definition, initialization and execution can be handled at meta-level i.e. in a separate aspect. This would keep the functional design and code oblivious to fault tolerance concerns and help decreasing the tangling of functional code with fault tolerant concerns as well. The performance and safety characteristic of three analytically redundant controllers reveal that high performance controllers possess less safety margin and vice versa. Thus the controller agility compromises the safety or stability. The dependability assessment exercise shows that design and programming mistakes like false gains or wrong polarity (false signs) leading to mission failures can be tolerated by proposed aspect oriented fault tolerant framework. Moreover input or output interface faults are also tolerated by avoiding partial (steady state errors) or complete failures using the proposed strategy. It has also been observed that faults introduced at the output interface have large error detection latency as compared to faults introduced at the input interface. Although the proposed approach is focused on a mathematical model of inverted pendulum system, yet the principles derived and a general aspect oriented fault tolerant framework proposed should be applicable to other real time mission/safety critical controllers without much difficulty. For example the proposed aspect oriented fault tolerant framework dictates architecture to modularize error detection, error recovery or masking strategies in a non intrusive way. This can be applied irrespective of any complex error detection mechanism. Moreover the switch over logic can be scaled up to more variants as well.
